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Introduction:  The Road from Lisbon 
 
The European Union at 50 years has become a complex and comprehensive entity. That 
may be a source of its strength but it is also a cause of skepticism for many Europeans. While the 
daily operation of the EU focuses principally upon its economic functions – the single market, 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), international trade and financial negotiations, etc., 
the EU has also become a force for policy evaluation and collective goals. Such aims are 
regularly expressed at periodic EU summits (meetings of the European Council) and other 
occasions (most recently the Berlin Declaration of March 2007). Periodically the EU launches 
broad policy initiatives that are supposed to commit the Union to future goals and regular 
monitoring of progress toward those goals. Such an initiative was launched in Lisbon, Portugal, 
at the EU summit in March 2000. The Lisbon Agenda (also called the Lisbon Goals or Lisbon 
Strategy) was ambitious, broad and vague in details. It called for revival of the sluggish EU 
economies and aimed to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven 
economy in the world by 2010.  It called specifically for increased economic growth and reduced 
unemployment, expanded investment in higher and continuing education and research and 
development efforts, and modernization of the “European social model” (i.e. welfare state) to 
protect the vulnerable and excluded (European Union. Council, 2000).  The employment rate 
target of 70% of the 15-64 population being gainfully employed by 2010, up from 63.5% in 
2000, was particularly ambitious. 
 
The Lisbon initiative added another layer of policy “surveillance” to the growing list of 
regional public policy monitoring. In addition to the macroeconomic data and analysis required 
in fulfillment of the Stability and Growth Pact of the EMU, various sectoral convergence 
programs, and broader EU evaluations, the Lisbon Agenda promised benchmarking of policy 
reforms and performance. In addition all of the fifteen EU countries that adopted the 2000 
program are part of the broader policy network of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) which has its own program of surveillance and benchmarking. There 
is no silence as to the aims of advanced western states in the social, economic, and policy arena. 
Implicit and often explicit in these common policy objectives is the expectation that national or 
regional experiences can assist other states in their reform efforts.  “Lesson-learning” and policy 
emulation have a long history, but rarely have pressures for improved performance and ranking 
of achievements been greater.  
 
  Despite the difficulties of comparing policies and performance across a growing and 
diverse community of advanced industrial states, elites and attentive publics look for “models” of 
success. The Scandinavian states, three of which are full EU members (Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden) while two belong to the European Economic Area (Iceland and Norway), have again 
come into view as interesting cases of success. In part this is the result of their rapid recovery 
from economic difficulties – in some cases quite severe – during the recent past (1980s - 1995). 
It is also because these small but open societies have long attracted outside observers and believe 
themselves to be a distinct policy “region.” 
 
In this paper we argue that the Scandinavian policy reforms of the past two decades have 
not only reinforced their comprehensive welfare states but demonstrate that such welfare states    2
                                                
are fully compatible with healthy economic growth and structural change.  We will offer 
evidence that the Scandinavian “model” has again emphasized reform and adjustment but also 
continues to demand a commitment to solidarity. We will argue that their democratic corporatist 
structures that involve the labor-market partners in making and administering national policy 
have been supportive of this adaptation. The Scandinavian solution remains expensive in terms 
of taxation, but has not “frozen” policies into a strict mold. Its commitment to child allowances, 
paid maternity (now parental) leave, and public provision of excellent child care and care of the 
elderly encourage much higher levels of female labor force participation than has been the 
European norm; indeed, it is difficult to see how the Lisbon employment rate target can be 
achieved without similar policies in other European Union countries. Finally the “flexicurity” 
model emphasizes security and opportunity at the “macro” level – new skills, new jobs, and 
transitional assistance without locking employees into declining firms and sectors. 
 
Let us begin with a review of the Scandinavian model:  its origins, its accomplishments, 




1. The rise and fall of the Scandinavian model
1
 
The small nations that comprise the Scandinavian area constitute a social laboratory for 
the Western world.   
 –  Walter  Galenson,  Labor in Norway (1949)  
 
  From the 1930s through the 1980s, the Scandinavian countries in general and Sweden in 
particular were frequently described as being models for the development of humane, democratic 
policies for other societies.  From Frederic Howe’s Denmark: A Cooperative Commonwealth 
(1921) and Marquis Childs’ volume Sweden: The Middle Way (1936) through Walter Galenson’s 
Labor in Norway (1949), Hudson Strode’s Sweden: Model for a World (1949), Richard 
Tomasson’s Sweden: Prototype of Modern Society (1970), and  Der Spiegel’s cover story 
“Schweden -- Modell für Bonn?  Blick auf Schweden – Blick in die Zukunft” (1972) to our own 
volume Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia (1989), 
foreign journalists and scholars found much in Scandinavian policies that, they thought, was 
admirable and deserved emulation in their own societies. 
 
  At least in times of crisis elsewhere, this literature enjoyed substantial popularity. Child’s 
Middle Way, which appeared in the midst of the Depression in the capitalist West and Stalin’s 
purges in the communist Soviet Union, went through at least 22 printings in three editions, 
 
1Although we use the terms “Scandinavian” and “Nordic” interchangeably  in this paper, there are sometimes 
significant national differences in the social and economic policies of the five Nordic states. All still conform, 
however, to the “universalist, social democratic model” based on generous tax financed benefits and programs 
accessible to all. We note growing deviations from that model.  This paper deals primarily with Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden because of its European Union orientation, and we will generally limit our examples to those countries. 
Norway and Iceland, members of the European Economic Area, share most of these commonalities and some of the 
problems.   3
including six within seven months of its initial appearance.  Its reviews drove home its 
importance:  “Let messengers ride forth,” wrote New Deal official and chief trustbuster Thurman 
Arnold, “to the frightened men on courts and in editorial sanctums ... bearing the glad tidings that 
a country has been discovered where governmental power is exercised in great humanitarian 
enterprises without either the loss of civil liberty or the destruction of private capital” (Arnold 
1936, p. 614).  Childs’ volume remains the most widely sold English-language book on any 
aspect of Scandinavia.  (For its impact and Childs other writing on Sweden, see Logue 1999, pp. 
162-64.) 
 
  There was also an alternative, darker vision of Scandinavia as model.  Writing in the 
Saturday Evening Post in 1959, Peter Wyden linked Sweden’s welfare measures to alcoholism, 
suicide, and crime. This admonitory literature grew particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, as the 
Social Democratic project was completed.  Scandinavia could be viewed as a nightmarish 
amateur Brave New World, as in English journalist Roland Huntford’s  Sweden: The New 
Totalitarians (1972) or as the epitome of economic inflexibility as in Per-Martin Meyerson, 
Eurosclerosis – The Case of Sweden (1985). More thoughtful and evidence-based critics such as 
Assar Lindbeck et al. Turning Sweden Around (1994) proposed drastic medicine that would 
scale-back the generosity and administrative inflexibility of Sweden’s universalistic social 
programs while restructuring its economy for a post-industrial age. Similar analyses assessed the 
other Nordic states and those, like the Netherlands, that shared their ambitions.   
 
  Like beauty in the eyes of the beholder, the definition of the “Scandinavian model” has 
varied with the commentator.  It often seemed to be a metaphor for what the commentators 
sought (or feared) in their own societies.  
 
Of late foreign eyes have again been focused the region for positive reasons. After severe 
recessions in the early 1990s, the Nordic countries again seem to have found a formula for 
moderate but steady economic growth, fiscal balance and sustainability, and a renewed 
commitment to a universal welfare state that now emphasizes “activation,” innovation, and 
continuous assessment. In addition to positive assessments by the International Monetary Fund 
(especially its 2003 survey of Sweden [Chakur, et al. 2003]) and the OECD, over the past year a 
spate of news articles in Newsweek, The Economist, and amazingly Forbes have described the 
renewed Scandinavian model as “flexicurity” in action. As the latter source defines it, flexicurity 
is the “Third Way tradeoff [that] gives employers the right to hire and fires easily, while the state 
guarantees a good wage [i.e. unemployment benefit] and retraining for the fired” (Karlgaard, 
2006; see also Sachs 2006 and Cohn 2007). French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, not 
one usually impressed by foreigners, has been inspired by particularly the Danish variant of 
flexicurity because of the rapid decline of Danish unemployment, including youth 
unemployment, over the past decade. He was not able to convince the “French Street,” however, 
that such reforms should be attempted at home.  
 
  Are these lessons for the rest of the European Union in the Scandinavian policy reforms 
which appear to have stabilized their extensive and solidaristic welfare states?  And are these 
lessons relevant for the problems confronting the larger EU states of France, Germany, and Italy? 
We note that Great Britain is both an alternative neo-liberal model (under Thatcher and Major,   4
                                                
1979-1997) and a variant of the Scandinavian reforms (under Blair since 1997). Likewise the 
Scandinavian “renewal” shares many characteristics of the Netherland’s reform program since 
the 1980s.
2 Regional distinctions must not be exaggerated.  
 
What is the Scandinavian model? 
 
  For the purposes of this paper, our question is defining a model useful elsewhere in the 
larger EU advanced industrial states that comprise the heart of the EU-15. The Scandinavian 
model has always been limited by the particular economic, social, historical, and political 
characteristics of the countries themselves. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are small, affluent, 
rational democracies which have built upon more than a century of positive social policies. Even 
Finland, which has had a more unique historical and political experience, has over the past 
quarter century converged fully on the Scandinavian model. In policies areas such as education, 
technology, and economic restructuring, it has become the “leading edge” of innovation and 
reform.  
 
  When we venture outside of the Scandinavian region, qualifications and limitations 
quickly become apparent. Elsewhere we assessed the relevance of the Scandinavian model for 
the eastern Baltic region including northeastern Germany (mainly the former German 
Democratic Republic) Poland, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (Einhorn and Logue 2006). 
The EU and the European region have become increasingly diverse in its recent history, policy 
priorities, and socio-economic challenges. This makes any discussion of “models” tentative and 
limited. Following in the tradition of Richard Rose (2001) and others, we believe that “lessons” 
or models rarely can be transplanted from one national experience to another without 
considerable modification.  This is even true with the Nordic region. Yet when confronted by 
serious, intractable, and politically fraught challenges, some leaders look abroad for inspiration if 
not templates. The “Anglo-Saxon” model has been flagged as the main economic policy 
alternative to the “Eurosclerosis” problem despite growing issues of poverty and inequality 
especially in the United States and Great Britain.  Although economic growth and even 
unemployment statistics contain some variables often overlooked by policy “scorekeepers” – 
such as the role of population growth in GDP performance and various definitions of 
unemployment, negative stereotypes have often paralyzed innovation in the larger EU states. The 
political distance between these states and the Nordic countries is less despite inevitable issues of 
size.  
  
  For the purpose of this paper, the salient characteristics of the Scandinavian model are  
 
  (1) an activist and interventionist state, relying mainly on regulation and transfer 
payments which   
 
 
2 The various categorization schemes for national models generally distinguish between the neo-liberal Anglo-
American (UK, especially under Thatcher, Ireland, and the US), statist/Christian Democratic (France, Italy) which 
have tended toward greater rigidity, and corporatist but less flexible (Germany, Austria), and Scandinavia/Benelux 
which are corporatist and apparently more flexible. 
   5
                                                
  (2) provides universal transfer payments to support the elderly, disabled, unemployed, 
and families with numerous children and low market incomes;  
 
  (3) provides universal mostly non-means-tested social services for health, education, 
childcare, services for the elderly and the like; 
  
  (4) uses national policy to achieve high rates of labor-force participation and full 
employment on the national level, via both macro-economic and sectoral policies;  
 
  (5) integrates major interest groups in making and implementing national policies (rather 
than the capture of the state structure by a single group of interests, or state capture of the interest 
organizations);  
 
  (6) possesses a strong civil society with encompassing and democratic organization of 
interests, but particularly the strong organizations of those otherwise weakest in capitalist society 
-- family farmers and urban workers
3; and  
 
  (7) is underpinned by a set of values around empiricism and social trust; in particular, 
solidarity and reciprocal responsibility are crucial concepts in the development of public policy. 
 
  The benefits of the model appear to flow from the structural features that make up points 
1 to 4.  The question we raise in Part III of the paper is whether these benefits can flow purely 
from state structures or whether points 5-7, underpinnings of a strong civil society and of the 
values of the Scandinavian “popular movements” – the agrarian and labor movements of the 19
th 
and 20
th centuries – are, in fact, key to success. The ideas and policy innovations adopted by the 
Scandinavian countries during the past half-century are now shared among other west European 
states. What differs may be the Scandinavians’  political ability to implement policy reforms and 
innovations more quickly and thoroughly than the so-called “blocked” societies. Part of the 
“Lisbon Process” since 2000 (and its predecessors) has been to gain broader commitments in the 
EU to “best practices” as evidenced by policy success.  
 
  
The model under pressure I: The changing global context for economic policy 
 
  One additional caveat to Scandinavian transferability needs to be raised: the changed 
international context. 
 
  By and large, from the origins of the Scandinavian model during the Depression in the 
1930s to the 1980s, the model assumed that the nation state was appropriate unit for making  
policy.  Indeed, the careful calibration of Swedish Keynesianism in the 1930s through 1960s  
 
3For 150 years the Scandinavian countries have developed a panoply of encompassing civic and economic 
organizations: farmers, industrial workers, businesses, women’s, etc. Other EU countries share some of these 
characteristics but their history, e.g. Germany, disrupted the continuity and extent of civic organization. Moreover 
the Scandinavian corporatist tradition has fostered a direct role by these movements in policy design, bargaining, 
and implementation.    6
                                                
through sectoral policies, geographic policies, and corporate investment funds in addition to 
macro-economic policy gave Sweden a growth edge while making her virtually recession proof 
precisely because the nation-state was the appropriate and bounded unit for economic policy.   
 
  In the 1930s to 1950s, the transfer payment portion of the welfare state model – which 
was significantly counter-cyclical – was designed simply to keep together the body and soul of 
the unemployed, injured, or sick worker.  It was relatively inexpensive. Income replacement 
ratios for those pushed out of work temporarily, like the unemployed, averaged about 40% of 
market wages; replacement ratios were a bit lower for those permanently excluded. Further, it 
assumed the traditional workforce: men and unmarried women.  Married women stayed home 
and raised kids, at least in bourgeois families and in families of better-paid skilled workers.  
 
  In the late 1960s and early 1970s after a decade of virtually continuous economic 
expansion, income replacement ratios were raised to 70-80% of market wages for those 
temporarily out of work.
4  Pensions for the elderly and disabled were pushed up as well.  Tax 
policy was revamped to increase female labor-force participation, and high quality daycare and 
then after-school care were added as new social services to support housewives’ mass movement 
into paid employment.  The consequence was to dramatically increase the effectiveness and the 
cost of the welfare state in an economic downturn – just before the economic dispensation 
changed.  
 
  When that dispensation changed, as it did in the 1970s and 1980s with the oil crises and 
global economic waves washing over the Scandinavian economies, the national economic policy 
model – on which the rest of the model rested – began to stumble. The oil crisis of 1973-74 was 
followed by “stagflation,” a debilitating blend of economic stagnation with inflation that 
conventional economic theory did not permit.  The stabilization of demand through Scandinavian 
welfare measures -- both transfer payments and social services -- certainly proved itself in 
sustaining living standards, keeping unemployment relatively low and maintaining continued 
high labor force participation during this period.  With the exception of Norway, all of the 
Scandinavian states faced severe economic turbulence between 1975 and 1995. Government 
budget deficits skyrocketed. There were recurring trade deficits, government deficits, and 
financial crises as public policies radically reduced rates of inflation and deregulated financial 
markets.  Slower growth led to much higher levels of unemployment which in turn strained the 
generous compensation system. Both public and private deficits were significantly financed by 
international borrowing, and that began to pressure national currencies.  The situation was 
unsustainable, except in Norway, which borrowed more but did so to invest in building the 
infrastructure for the North Sea oil bonanza.
5   
 
4In 1996, income replacement ratios for the unemployed varied between 80% in Denmark for up to 260 weeks and 
85% in Sweden for 60 weeks; by contrast, the replacement ratio was 60% in the United States for only 26 weeks 
after which the replacement ratio dropped to zero. (As of March 2007, only 1.9% of the 4.4% unemployed in the US 
were able to draw unemployment compensation.) Curiously the sharp increase in the replacement ratios in 
Scandinavia in the late 1960s and early 1970s appears to have taken place without a discussion of the impact on 
global competitiveness.  Rather, it was in the context of the then-current “equality debate.” 
 
5At $3 per barrel for Saudi oil in 1972, North Sea oil was an interesting geological anomaly.  It cost more   7
                                                                                                                                                            
  
  Innovative Swedish efforts to adapt national economic policy to a globalized economy -- 
through financing a “production for inventory” scheme in the 1970s by using inexpensive 
foreign borrowing during the recession to continue domestic production to be  exported when the 
global economy recovered -- failed by increasing inflation relative to trading partners and  
raising foreign debt.  The Swedes were finally forced  to devalue the Swedish currency to 
dispose of the bloated inventories. In part the failure of this apparently brilliant approach to 
“bridging” the international economic downturn stemmed simply from the virtually interminable 
length of the international economic downturn after the oil crisis of 1973-74 that far exceeded 
the length of any other post-war recession.  In part, however, the failure reflected the 
transformation of the global economy.  The nation state was ceasing to be the appropriate unit 
for making economic policy. 
 
  A genuine Scandinavian -- and world -- economic recovery did not follow the oil crises 
of 1973-74 and 1979-81 until Reagan’s experiment with “supply-side economics” which pumped 
out the largest demand-side stimulus -- and largest American budget deficits -- since World War 
II.  Most of that stimulus flowed out of the American economy to simulate international 
economic growth in the mid- and late-1980s, though at the costs of then-unprecedented 
American current account and budget deficits.
6  The return to economic expansion in 
Scandinavia did not result from national economic measures, though those were helpful, so much 
as from American deficits stimulating the whole international economy. 
 
   The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991 
further changed the equation. If Childs had seen Sweden as the “middle way” between the crisis-
prone but democratic capitalism of the West and the Stalinist autocracy of the Soviet Union, 
what happened to the “middle way” when the marker on the one side of the road disappeared?   
 
  At the same time, growing economic globalization meant that national economic policies 
were not sufficient to reinflate the domestic economies in the face of the recession of early 
1990s.
7  Worse, in addition to the international recession, Finland’s exports were devastated by 
 
to produce than it yielded.  With Saudi oil at $12 a barrel in 1974, North Sea oil was a commercial proposition.  
Despite some tough readjustments in the mid-1980s and late 1990s when oil prices temporarily fell, Norway has 
never looked back. 
 
6If the situation seems similar to the American economic situation today, it is because the policies are 
identical.  Massive demand stimulus in the United States is fueling the export-led Japanese economic recovery from 
the collapse of the property bubble of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Asian “Tiger” recovery from the currency 
crisis of 1997-98, and continuing explosive Chinese growth. By contrast, real wages have been stagnant or declining 
in the US since the mid-1970s and household incomes have risen modestly in real terms only because of higher 
female labor-force participation.  The 2005 US current account deficit of $805 billion was the largest in international 
economic history, and also the largest the US has sustained as a percent of GDP (6.4%). It constitutes a massive 
stimulus to the rest of the world’s economy. 
 
7 Curiously the entry of the former Soviet bloc into the global economy did not bring large-scale, low-cost, 
low-quality industrial manufacturing competitors to the global market.  The neo-liberal economic “reform” policies 
of the Yeltsin administration, ably supported by the advice and paid assistance of the International Monetary Fund, 
the US Treasury, USAID, Sweden’s own Anders Åslund, and the corruption-plagued Harvard Institute for   8
                                                                                                                                                            
the collapse of the Soviet and CMEA
8 markets, where the Finns had enjoyed a privileged 
position as an advanced industrial neutral.  Finnish unemployment ballooned to 18%, a near 
Depression-era marker.  Sweden, much less dependent on exports to the East but significantly 
dependent on trade with Finland, saw its own unemployment spike to 8%, extraordinarily high 
by post-war Swedish standards.   
 
  But if the nation state is no longer the appropriate venue for economic policy, what is? 
 
One answer has been “Europe,” or more specifically the European Union. As economic 
optimism returned at the end of the 1990s, the EU turned its attention to accelerated growth, 
social policy reform, and international competitiveness. The previous decade had emphasized the 
“single EU market,” the Maastricht Treaty, and the emerging Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) with its attendant Stability and Growth Pact to enforce fiscal and monetary discipline on 
the EMU. Now the issue of restoring and maintaining dynamism was primary. This was 
formalized at the Lisbon Summit in March 2000 under the Portuguese presidency. The resulting 
“Lisbon Agenda” is lengthy with emphasis on a broad range of reforms and innovations most of 
which required national action (European Union. Council 2000). A substantial portion of the 
agenda focuses on labor force enhancement and social policy reforms that emphasize integration 
and activation of many social welfare recipients and increase the employment rate (i.e., the 
proportion of the population in the 15-64 age categories which is gainfully employed).  
 
The model under pressure II: Domestic strains 
 
  Global economic pressure exacerbated domestic welfare-state design problems.  There 
were five principal sources of strain: changing gender and family roles, tax system design, 
generational cultural change, the graying of Scandinavians, and immigration.  These five factors 
were, to a considerable extent, interlocked, and each tended to drive the others.   
 
  In loco uxora. In the heady days of economic expansion in the 1960s and early 1970s, the 
Scandinavian countries committed themselves to women’s economic equality. This did not just 
mean equal wages for equal work for those in the labor market.  It meant equal access to gainful 
employment – genuine equal opportunity.  That required either a fundamental change in gender 
roles in the family – men taking an equal role in child rearing and household chores – or a 
dramatic expansion in public social services to include the traditional care-giving roles of the 
housewife.  
 
  The Scandinavians talked about the former but actually took the latter course.  But it was 
expensive for the state to provide the services to children and the elderly that had previously 
 
International Development, devastated the Russian economy, destroying much of its productive capacity, 
eliminating its social security system, and producing the largest fall in life expectancy in peace time since the Black 
Plague. Imagine the economies of the West today had the former Soviet economy been retooled as a Chinese-style 
industrial competitor – rather than as a refrigerated Saudi Arabia. 
8 CMEA=Council for Mutual Economic Assistance also called “Comecon.” It denoted the economic organization of 
the Soviet satellite states of eastern and central Europe.  
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been provided by housewives, at least if these services were to be provided at the level of quality 
that Social Democratic ideology and bourgeois sensibility required.   
 
  Most working class women -- especially the unmarried; wives of farm workers, those 
married to unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and those whose husbands were in industrially 
pressed skilled trades like shoemaking -- had always worked: domestic service, retail, and 
factory, part-time or full time. Theirs were latchkey kids with the older taking care of the 
younger. Through the 1950s, the Social Democratic dream was, if you could push up male wages 
sufficiently, the working class could achieve the bourgeois luxury of the “non-working” wife. 
 
  The ideal changed in the 1960s and 1970s.  Women’s mass entry into the labor force 
came to be seen as a good for women and for a democratic society, not a regrettable consequence 
of poverty and low wages nor an emergency of war.  Female labor force participation exploded 
from between 37% (Norway) and 53% (Sweden) in the 1960s to between 73% (Finland) and 
80% (Iceland) by 2005.  By contrast, EU-15 female labor force participation grew from 44% to 
only 57% in the same period (OECD, 2006, 32-3).  As the cost of daycare, after-school care, and 
home assistance for the elderly similarly exploded in the public budget, higher taxes followed.  
And higher marginal taxes on full-time male earners along with the labor shortages of the 1960s 
increased the pressure on remaining housewives to seek gainful employment, and that forced 
further expansion of state services to children and the elderly. While these costs could have been 
accommodated by permanent shifts in budgetary priorities, no one wanted to cut other rapidly 
expanding programs such as health care, post-secondary education, and income security. The 
Scandinavian states have sustained dual-careers and increased labor-market equality for women 
at rates above all of the other EU countries (see Table 1, below; see also Jordan, 2006).  
 
  The shift from taxing the family as a unit to individual taxation – an equality measure – 
also drove the process.  When marginal rates were low, there was no tax push to drive women 
into the labor market.  However, with individual income taxation and quickly rising marginal 
rates (which peaked at 73% in Denmark – Sweden was even higher – for even moderately paid 
professionals in the early 1980s), the rationality of adding a second salary – taxed at less than 
half the rate of adding additional income to the first salary – forced even women who much 
preferred taking care of their own children and parents into paid employment taking care of the 
children and the parents of their neighbors. 
 
 Tax  conundrums.   The Scandinavian tax systems themselves were poorly designed for 
high marginal rates, and tax system redesign lagged the destructive impact of rising marginal 
rates.  The basic problem was that high tax rates reshape economic behavior -- something noted 
with regularity since Roman times and possibly before.  The worst Scandinavian problem in 
terms of economic impact was the combination of very high marginal tax rates with the 
deductibility of mortgage and consumer interest in a high interest rate environment.  If you are 
paying 65% in marginal taxes and your mortgage interest is fully tax deductible, your effective 
interest rate after taxes at a 10% nominal rate is 3.33%; if the rate doubles to 20%, you pay only 
6.67% post-tax.  So the housing market ceased to be interest-rate sensitive, fueling a housing 
price boom and house debt explosion that, at its worst, was reducing the tax base by 1% of gross 
taxable income annually.  The dislocations got worse and worse. By the time the governments   10
finally got the political nerve to deal with the situation by reducing the deductibility of mortgage 
interest in the late 1980s, a major housing price bubble had been created that rested primarily on 
the tax system.  As a consequence of reducing mortgage deductibility and marginal taxes, 
homeowners found themselves with mortgages they couldn’t support, the housing bubble burst, 
and the banking sector had to be bailed out.   
 
  A similar, but economically less significant problem cropped up in the preferential tax 
treatment of capital gains.  At low marginal tax rates, preferential tax treatment for capital gains 
fundamentally compensates for inflation and produces few distortions.  At Scandinavian tax rates 
in the 1980s, converting taxable income into capital gains became the sport of the rich.  Even the 
state got into the act.  At a public finance nadir, Danish governmental agencies in early 1980s 
aided and abetted tax evasion by issuing bonds carrying half the market rate of interest (which 
was taxable as regular income at high marginal rates) at half their face value to create a (non-
taxable) capital gain.  
 
  Business investment, however, remained sensitive to interest rates.  When interest rates 
rose, business investment dropped.  As the housing market soaked up more investment cutting 
the taxable income base, rational business men began to park their capital in those cut-rate 
government bonds which yielded tax-privileged capital gains, doing double damage to the 
economy - cutting employment (and raising social spending) while further reducing the tax base. 
 
  These issues of tax system design were, of course, soluble with enough political will to 
endure the pain.  The Danes, Swedes and Norwegians all dealt with tax reform in the 1980s, 
though with considerable economic pain in deflating the real estate bubble.  Basically they 
broadened the tax base by reducing deductions and various forms of tax-privileged income, and 
that enabled them to lower marginal rates. 
 
  Generational culture and take-up rates.  A clear source of welfare-state stress has been 
the tendency of more Scandinavians to make use of various welfare measures.   
 
  Most Scandinavian welfare measures were universal; means testing was a rarity.  The 
unwritten assumption was that citizens exercised self-restraint, seeking benefits only as needed.  
Certainly for a generation, that held true. The bourgeoisie and upper classes shied away from 
welfare benefits with their “working class” and “Social Democratic” stigmas.  Good Social 
Democratic and Communist workers sought benefits only when really needed because of the 
“superior ethics” of the working class.  This self-restraint enabled the Scandinavians to build 
extraordinary edifices of welfare benefits that overlaid, for example, regular unemployment 
compensation with part-time unemployment compensation and with emergency cash payments 
for family disasters -- like having a fire ravage your apartment -- when you were unemployed. 
 
  But values are tied to generations, and as the generation which had built the welfare state 
through Depression, war and Resistance passed from the scene, its values passed with it. Thus 
part-time unemployment compensation, designed for dockworkers and day laborers in 
construction, became used by part-time university instructors trying to work their way into 
tenured positions. Upper class company managers who lost their jobs to mergers couldn’t make   11
mortgage payments on their villas on unemployment compensation, so they applied for 
emergency cash relief. Benefit use by some youths seeking to “find themselves,” as well as 
dependents of immigrants soured the tradition of disciplined solidarity.  
 
  Similarly, but more generally, Danish sick-pay statistics indicate that the young are sicker 
than the old, even after adjustment for taking care of sick children, a legitimate reason for calling 
in sick that affects the young disproportionally.  Health statistics demonstrate that they aren’t.  
They are, however, more likely to call in sick.  
 
  If the Scandinavian welfare states have clearly rested on a combination of a strong work 
ethic and a sense of self-restraint in the founding generation, and on class solidarity and ethnic 
homogeneity throughout the society, changing generational culture forces significant 
recalibration. So did immigration. 
  Immigration and the new Scandinavians.    Into the 1970s, the Scandinavian countries 
were extraordinarily homogeneous in terms of language, race, and religion.  There were 
geographic pockets of diversity – Swedes in western Finland and on the Åland Islands, Germans 
in South Jutland, and Sami (Lapps) in the far north of Norway, Sweden and Finland – but they 
had been there time out of mind and were generally covered by special legislation to protect their 
rights to cultural self-determination in the case of Swedes in Finland and Germans in Denmark, 
or it was easy to add new legislation to protect their culture, as in the case of the Sami.  Indeed, 
one could argue that the values of solidarity and reciprocity underlying the Scandinavian model 
were a result of this homogeneity notwithstanding occasional class and geographical cultural 
differences and antagonisms. 
 
  While the Scandinavian countries today still remain relatively homogenous by the 
standards of immigrant societies like the American, five percent of the population of Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden are foreign citizens.  While a fifth of these come from the other Nordic 
countries, for the first time the Scandinavian countries have a noticeably diverse population in 
terms of race and religion, especially in the major urban centers.   
 
  This has affected the universalistic Scandinavian welfare model in two ways.  First, the 
new immigrant communities did not share the norms regarding welfare use, any more than they 
shared other national cultural norms.  With larger families, lower wages, and fewer working 
women, new immigrant families were clearly entitled to a disproportionate share of benefits.   
Second, they were visibly different in language, religion, culture and complexion.   
 
These changes have been accompanied with less political civility than most Scandinavian 
politicians would have wished. Stories of abuse abounded, making the new immigrants a target 
for the New Right – particularly the Danish People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party. 
Although Sweden remains quite “liberal” in accepting immigrants joining relatives in Sweden 
and in conferring citizenship, entrance requirements for non-EU immigrants have been tightened 
in Denmark, Finland, and Norway as in other EU countries (e.g. Netherlands, Britain, et al.). 
 
  The graying of Scandinavia. The greatest apparent threat to the Scandinavian model is 
demography: an aging population leaves fewer active workers supporting more retirees.  It’s the   12
                                                
General Motors syndrome raised to a societal level. Worse (or better, depending on your 
perspective), retirees are living longer. The over-80 segment is the fastest growing part of the 
Scandinavian population.  The combination of larger numbers of pensioners and higher medical 
costs would seem to threaten the stability of the welfare system. 
 
  Here, as will be discussed in the next section, the Scandinavians have been quite 
proactive, perhaps because demographic change is so predictable.  They have undertaken general 
pension reforms that have increased funding and extended the average years of work before 
retirement.   
 
  Medical cost increases have been restrained by maintaining a fairly centralized national 
health system.  From 1990 to 2000, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland (as the only OECD 
countries) managed to lower health care costs as percentage of GDP. Despite a significantly 
older population than that of the United States, Scandinavians spend only 60% as much for 




II. Reinventing the Scandinavian Model 
 
  By 1990 the Scandinavian welfare state model faced a looming crisis. It shared that status 
with most other European welfare state models for many of the same reasons. Two decades of 
slower economic growth, demographic change (falling birthrates and aging populations), and 
globalization had undercut the economic foundation of many key social policies. The generous 
unemployment system with its high replacement of previous wages (at least for industrial 
workers) and employment measures to provide new jobs staggered under sustained 
unemployment. In Denmark unemployment had crawled upward since 1974 and despite some 
cyclical improvements in late 1980s and various “job creation” initiatives (including an early 
retirement scheme that proved disastrously popular), jobless numbers remained high into the 
1990s. In Sweden and Finland, the sudden and severe economic crisis that hit both countries 
after 1990 sent their economies into the sharpest decline in two generations. Social policy 
mitigated the shock for individuals, but there were clear warnings that the fundamental model – 
which distributes income and social services across generations as much as between income 
groups – could not be sustained without reform.  
 
  Our proposition is that through their significant reforms the Scandinavian states have 
once again demonstrated their pragmatic but active policy process and added new options to 
other states seeking to make their social welfare system compatible with the 21
st Century 
economy and society. Although the Scandinavian welfare policies still “redistribute” substantial 
economic resources, their reforms have renewed their focus on making society pay its own way. 
 
9 But, then, so do almost all of the nations we like to compare ourselves with, as well as an increasing number of 
those with which we do not generally compare ourselves, like the Czech Republic, Cuba, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Singapore, Slovenia, and Spain on infant mortality, for example. It seems that we will remain safely ahead 
of Africa, most of Latin America, and parts of Asia for another several decades, but infant mortality is already lower 
in Beijing than in New York. 
   13
                                                
For more than a decade, public budgets have generally been in balance (or even run significant 
surpluses). The emphasis on education, activation, and job placement has reduced, but not 
eliminated, the number of able-bodied welfare recipients. Pension reforms have improved the 
prospects for future generations to enjoy their retirement through compulsory savings and wise 
investments. Moreover, these reforms have increased rather than eroded the competitive position 
of the Nordic countries in the world economy. Hence across Europe governments and social 
scientists show renewed interest in these “laboratories” for social democracy. 
 
   As discussed above, there will always be important limits and caveats in analyzing the 
Scandinavian models especially for “export” to different societies and economies. These 
countries remain small, broadly democratic, and despite heavy immigration, politically 
homogeneous. When France (61 million) or Germany (82 million) looks at Sweden (9 million) 
or Finland (5.5 million), there are inevitably significant issues of scale. Most of the EU states are 
closer to the Nordic scale, but those of central and eastern Europe [still] have followed a very 
different path over the past century. Yet there are clearly good reasons for the broader European 
interest in the Scandinavian “reform wave” of the past fifteen years. The principles and goals of 
full-employment, fiscal balance, social policy planning, and policy efficiency can benefit widely 
differing national cases. 
 
  The Scandinavian model, like most other European social welfare systems, rests on four 
fundamental premises. First, effective management of the economy will promote rising 
production of goods and services and full employment of the labor force. Since the 1930s 
macroeconomic management has been in the hands of the Government – especially the Finance 
Ministry and the central bank. Microeconomic management has during the past thirty years 
moved strongly in favor of the private sector. Secondly, like Germany, Austria, and the Benelux 
countries democratic corporatist institutions (especially labor unions) participate in economic 
management in Scandinavia and pursue a “fair” distribution of economic gains and a “decent” 
redistribution of resources from those who are currently earning to those who are either 
temporarily (unemployed, studying, ill) or permanently (retired, permanently disabled) outside 
the market economy. Third, low income families with children need to have their market 
incomes enhanced through transfer payments and subsidized necessities, such as housing and 
child-care. Historically, the beneficiaries were unskilled workers in the cities and farm laborers 
in the countryside; today, the beneficiaries significantly are single parent families.  Fourth, key 
social services – especially medical care and education -- are provided on the basis of need, not 
ability to pay. 
 
  All these dimensions have been highly dynamic over the past century. During the past 
two decades there have been no serious alternatives proposed to a largely market-driven, 
privately owned production system for goods, but the importance of public provision of certain 
services – such as medical care, dental care, childcare, and care of the elderly – has grown.  State 
“regulated” sectors -- finance, housing, utilities, transportation, etc. -- have been liberalized with 
generally positive results.
10 Moreover although comprehensive and universal social welfare 
 
 10 An important detail is that deregulation of banking and finance during the late 1980s and early 1990s in 
Scandinavia as well many other regions unleashed the greatest number of banking scandals and failures since the 
1920s-30s. By the late 1990s most of these difficulties had been overcome, often with substantial public “bail-outs.”   14
                                                                                                                                                            
services have been available to Scandinavians since the 1960s, there has been considerable 
demand for expensive new programs (childcare and pre-school services, home health and service 
assistance for the disabled) and increased investment and expenditure in crucial social programs 
(e.g. healthcare and higher education).  Although the past decade has seen a significant 
expansion in “competitive” and alternative provision of social services by non-public providers, 
universalism and political control still guide the Scandinavian welfare states.
11 Residents have 
access to a vast array of publicly financed social, educational, and health services, but privately 
financed access has also been increasing.
12  
 
  The Scandinavian model remains set apart by its democratic corporatist institutions and 
rational policy culture.  The strength of the key economic interest organizations and their 
participation in shaping and implementing public policy continues to characterize Scandinavia.  
Not only have Scandinavian labor unions escaped the general decline of organized labor in the 
West, but union density has also actually increased (see Visser 2007 for comparative union 
density statistics).  Similarly the Scandinavian practice of fact-based, relatively consensual 
decision making has survived the rise of neo-liberalism.  While neo-liberalism seems to have 
promoted a deductive policy making process in a number of countries in which facts seemed 
immaterial, Scandinavia’s “neo-liberals” seemed almost as fact-bound as the Social Democrats 
and centrists. We will note the importance of these factors in the discussion of both the labor 
market policy and pension reforms below. 
 
 
The Rise of the Neo-Scandinavian Model 1990 – 2005 
 
  The “recovery” of the Scandinavian model from the economic turbulence of the late-
1980s and early 1990s was the result of social policy reforms, fiscal realism, and economic 
restructuring. It is important to mention, however, that between 1974 and 1990, each 
Scandinavian country had made some basic adjustments to the “first phase” of “Eurosclerosis.
13” 
Most crucially, as noted above, they undertook tax reforms that reduced deductions and tax-
privileged income to broaden the tax base and they cut marginal tax rates.  This helped restore a 
sense of fairness to the tax system and stopped the revenue erosion that was contributing to 
budgetary shortfalls. 
 
  Denmark had faced the most severe challenges as it entered the tunnel with considerable 
economic and social imbalance.  In 1974 Denmark had already built up considerable inflationary 
 
See Schwartz, 2001. 
 11 For example, private hospitals and clinics have appeared especially in urban areas. In some cases, such 
Stockholm, citizens are sent to these providers through the public health system. Private companies have long 
provided many “public services” such as ambulances and trash collection.  
 12 De-regulation and encouragement of private sector solutions do not usually extend to tax-subsidies. For 
example, employer-provided supplementary health insurance is taxed as regular income. 
13 “Eurosclerosis” refers to the structural barriers to economic and employment growth that plagued many European 
economies especially between 1980 and 2000. This was contrasted to the higher growth rates achieved in the US in 
that period (see Henderson 1993).  The term has been especially popular among “neo-liberal” economists who are 
critical of the public sector and regulated markets. Nevertheless, as evidenced by reforms enacted across Europe and 
the EU Lisbon Agenda, this latest form of “secular stagnation” is of concern across the ideological spectrum.   15
                                                
pressures that were multiplied by the country’s nearly total dependence on imported energy 
(mainly oil). Despite deficit spending – especially to fund generous unemployment and other 




  Sweden followed a similar course but was better armed with Keynesian counter-cyclical 
policy measures, especially its “active” labor market programs that channeled the unemployed 
into training programs and at least marginally productive public sector jobs and its 1970s 
inventory subsidy program that allowed Swedish industries to continue to produce in excess of 
immediate demand in foreign markets. Many of the Swedish programs focused at the micro-
economic level, such as the downsizing of the shipbuilding and steel industries, the direction of 
private sector investment to soak up labor left unemployed by major shutdowns, and national 
support for local infrastructure projects in hard-hit communities.  Maybe these just postponed 
adjustments until Sweden suffered severe shocks in the early 1990s.  
 
  Finland was also subject to these pressures but was buffered initially by its significant 
trade agreements with the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries. These markets accounted for 
a nearly 25 percent of Finnish exports and also guaranteed access to Soviet energy (oil, gas, and 
electricity) and other natural resources at less turbulent prices than those on the “free” world 




  Only oil-rich Norway by and large escaped these pressures.  Its problem was to avoid 
economic overheating caused by the oil boom that could price the rest of Norwegian goods out 
of the world market.  It did so primarily by segregating a great portion of the oil boom proceeds 
in the national “Petroleum Fund” which was invested outside the country.  That fund has now 
been dedicated to supporting the pension system in the future. 
 
  Denmark’s period of reform commenced in 1982 when the Social Democratic minority 
government resigned in favor of a non-socialist major coalition led by Prime Minister Poul 
Schlüter.  After an election in 1984 confirmed support, Schlüter’s coalition initiated a series of 
major fiscal and structural reforms that modified social policy, taxation, and business regulation. 
An improved international economy helped propel these reforms through with minimal pain. 
Inflation was sharply reduced without a prolonged increase in unemployment, which 
nevertheless was higher than the boom years of the 1964-74.
16 Denmark restored competitive 
balance to its major export industries without recurring currency devaluations.  The government 
continued to allow the collective bargaining system function, but intervened when deadlock 
threatened key economic sectors. Nevertheless unemployment rates fluctuated between 8 and 12 
percent until the various reforms along with sustained economic growth returned after 1994. By 
 
 14 Denmark turned initially to currency devaluations  – popular as well with its Nordic neighbors, but none 
of these measures could avoid public sector cutbacks and structural economic change. See Nannestad, 1991. 
 15 Particularly Finnish shipbuilding and wood and metal products were shielded from the rising East Asian 
competition. 
16 Danish unemployment rose from 21,000 in 1973 to 312,000 in 1983 and then declined to 176,000 in 
1988. In percentage terms the unemployment rate hit 11% in 1983 declined until the early 1990s when it again 
soared to 12% in 1993. Changes in statistical methods make exact comparisons difficult. OECD 1989.   16
2002 unemployment was down to 5.1 percent where, after a brief increase in 2003 and 2004, it 
remains today.  The combination of relatively unrestricted hiring and firing rules along with 
generous unemployment compensation and active labor market policies is the essence of the 
Danish flexicurity model (Stokes 2006).  It provides both labor market flexibility and individual 
economic security. 
 
  Although Sweden had managed to smooth out the economic turbulence of the 1974-84 
period through countercyclical fiscal policies and currency devaluations (an updated version of 
its policies in the 1930s), these measures failed to prevent the worst economic decline in more 
than fifty years after 1989. Between 1990 and 1993 Swedish GDP declined by 5 percent. The 
result was an agonizing reappraisal of both economic and social policy.  The non-socialist 
coalition government of Conservative Carl Bildt instituted drastic measures in 1991, but with the 
return of the Social Democrats to power in 1994, the emphasis shifted from cuts to reforms. 
Sweden’s “active labor market” policies that emphasize retraining and temporary work measures 
rather than passive dole payments were reinvigorated.  Although there is debate as to how 
effective such measures are in the long-term revival of modern economies, they did stimulate 
economic revival after 1994 and a return to modest but steady growth (along with fiscal balance) 
during the following decade.  
 
         Finland is the most dramatic case of change and reform under serious economic stress. 
By the end of the 1980s Finland’s unique economic model had demonstrated considerable 
resilience but faced growing challenges. With roughly a quarter of its foreign trade linked to the 
Soviet bloc states, stability and predictability was giving way to stagnation. In the 1980s exports 
and imports amounted to roughly 50% of the Finnish GDP. As the Soviet and other Communist 
economies began to collapse, Finland’s situation was dire. Moreover like its Nordic neighbors, 
Finland had faced internal financial instability at the end of the 1980s when banking and credit 
deregulation stimulated a housing and credit bubble.  These problems hit in 1990 and in the 
following years, the Finnish economy suffered its worst decline in peacetime. Unemployment 
surged to nearly 18 percent in 1994, four times the rate in 1989 with regional and youth 
unemployment nearly twice as high (Pohjala, 1999, p. 59-60, Nickell, 1999, pp. 62-3). The 
plunge in GDP approached 11 percent. There is no doubt that Finland’s social welfare programs 
prevented widespread hardship, but spending could not be sustained at such high levels 
(Osmanis, 1998).  
 
  Nevertheless, Finland’s economy began a sharp recovery in 1995, perhaps encouraged by 
its new membership in the European Union (January 1995) and commitment to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union. The latter was completed with the Finnish markka disappearing 
in 2002, but ironically the recovery itself may have been helped by the large devaluations of the 
markka a decade earlier. That “tool” will be absent should future economic disasters strike. 
Finland’s IT and telecommunications “niche” began to pay handsome dividends by the end of 
the decade. By 2005 Finnish per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity) was again 
comparable to its Scandinavian neighbors (Denmark and Sweden) and about 8 percent over the 
OECD level and 4 percent ahead of the EU-15 (OECD 2006, p. 12-13). Government debt and tax 
rates have declined modestly since the late 1990s (See Koskela and Uusitalo, 2004).  
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  While foreign observers have focused on “niches” that the Finnish (and other 
Scandinavian) economies have carved out of the global economy, social policy was part of the 
restructuring that has produced the currently strong performances. When hard times hit in the 
1980s and 1990s, the social safety net proved its worth, at considerable cost, and helped to 
reinforce the broad political consensus for reforms, cut-backs, and economic restructuring. The 
institutions of “democratic corporatism” showed their continued mettle in negotiating acceptable 
policy changes. This was not without conflict. Strikes and government intervention occasionally 
“banged heads together.” During the past decade Scandinavian democratic corporatism has again 
demonstrated its resilience and political value. Labor union membership has remained high 
contrary to trends in nearly all other western economies. Unions have successfully recruited in 
the growing service economy including both the advanced technological and less skilled sectors. 
The “organized” economy has shown flexibility as well as realism. Nearly all of the major policy 
reforms have been based on the traditional Scandinavian “scientific” policy model; that is, 
government commissions have recruited experts from academia, business organizations, and the 
labor movement to study problems and propose solutions. Universities and autonomous think-
tanks have added volumes of data and research on intricate issues such as economic structural 
change, technology, healthcare performance, and not least, old age pension alternatives. This 
does not replace either the periodic collective bargaining sessions or the political debate, but it 
does provide a generally accepted database of “facts” on which policy-makers and their 
constituents can frame the debate.  
 
  Let us look at policy redesign in two key areas:  active labor market policy in Denmark 
and pension reform in Sweden.  Both policy areas, in their separate ways, represented the 
culmination of industrial welfare state thinking.  Both had been designed successfully to respond 
to the problems of industrial capitalism in highly solidaristic and humane ways.  Both clearly 
faced serious problems in the new global dispensation.  The alignment of organizational forces 
driving the reform is suggestive of the adaptability of Scandinavian corporatism. 
  
  Danish labor market policy reform. Danish labor market policy through the 1980s 
combined a remarkably flexible system of labor market regulation with an astonishingly rigid 
system of unemployment compensation.  Both had served the Danish equally well through the 
good times in the 1960s and early 1970s.  That ceased to be the case after the first oil crisis. 
 
  Basic Danish labor market policy is set to a unique degree by collective bargaining, 
rather than by legislation.   To take the extreme case, for example, Denmark is one of the few 
countries in the world without a legal minimum wage.  Rather, the minimum wage is set by 
collective bargaining.  Equal pay for equal work – regardless of the gender of the worker – is 
also an outcome of collective bargaining. In fact, the entire edifice of Danish collective 
bargaining rests not on legislation but on the so-called “September Agreement,” the collectively 
bargained outcome of the great strike and lock-out of 1899, and subsequently collectively 
bargained agreements.   
 
  In principle, such a system should reflect the balance of power between unions and 
employers at any point in time.  In practice, however, the Danish Government has taken a strong 
interest in the outcome of national bargaining since the early 1930s.  With national collective   18
                                                
bargaining either through a single national framework agreement or through national sectoral 
agreements, the Government has frequently been a third party in the negotiating round, 
threatening to raise taxes to soak up excessive consumer buying power if the settlement was too 
lucrative for labor or offering incentives to reach agreement if employers looked like they would 
plunge the country into a national strike.   
 
  Not surprisingly in this system, unemployment compensation preceded legislation. 
Danish unions and employers fought in the 1870s and 1880s over who would control 
unemployment compensation system which developed out of the guilds’ travel benefit funds.  
Ultimately, the unions prevailed.  They developed a craft-based union unemployment 
compensation system which obtained partial public subsidy shortly before World War I.  The 
availability of public support allowed unskilled unions to provide unemployment compensation 
to their members as well.  Until the early 1970s, unemployment compensation and employment 
services were controlled by the individual unions and, for many years after the end of this direct 
control, craft thinking continued to shape both.
17 The result was, as unemployment rose in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, government “activation” measures – emergency employment when 
unemployment compensation was about to be exhausted – were designed primarily to keep the 
unemployed eligible for unemployment compensation.  The Danish system provided up to five 
years of unemployment compensation and, with periods of activation, could continue virtually 
indefinitely.  Indeed craft thinking came to characterize the thinking of the new unions for 
university graduates, so that students trained as college preparatory high school history teachers 
or French teachers could spend the best years of their working lives unemployed or in public-
sector “activation” jobs, rather than using their knowledge and skills in some other profession.  
 
  This changed in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  In the late 1980s, unions and employers 
agreed to seek “to secure both the competitiveness of enterprises and the employment of 
employees” (Andersen and Mailand 2005, p. 3).  The 1987 Joint Declaration of the Danish 
Employers Confederation and Trade Union Federation overtly traded wage restraint for 
employment, following the 1982 Dutch model.  
 
  It was fleshed out by a series of agreements that increased flexibility.  It has long been 
easier to hire and fire in Denmark than is generally the case in Europe, in large measure because 
Danish industry is based on smaller units and the government has been slow to legislate job 
security.  The small size of Danish employers also encourages increased turnover in pursuit of 
advancement.  Thus Danish job tenure is the shortest in Scandinavia (a bit over 8 years versus a 
bit over 10 years in Finland and over 11 years in Sweden) and shorter than other OECD 
countries except the US and the UK (a bit over 6 years and 8 years respectively) (Plougmann and 
Madsen 2002, p. 10).  Danish national bargaining agreements had long provided flexibility in 
wage determination in the plant level in a system that is sufficiently complex that foreign 
observers generally ignore it.  While working hours are set centrally, central agreements 
 
17 Though Swedish and Finnish unions had comparable control over the unemployment compensation and services 
system, they were organized along industrial lines, and thus lacked the craft rigidities of the Danish system.  
Moreover, the Swedish unions in particular had a strong prejudice against idleness and enforced a policy of early 
return to work or to training on the part of the unemployed that was coupled with a much shorter maximum (60 
weeks) period of unemployment compensation (versus 260 weeks in Denmark).   19
expanded the scope for local agreements on working hours, and they expanded flexibility in the 
37 hour week by spreading it as an average over 6 weeks (before 1995) to over 6 months (1995-
98) and finally to over 12 months (1998 – present).  Training and education also increased labor 
flexibility. Bargaining agreements provided for a week of paid training in 1991 and expanded 
that to 2 weeks in 1993.  As of 2003, more than ½ of the Danish population said they had taken 
part in training or education in the previous 12 months (Andersen and Mailand 2005, pp. 13-14). 
 
  The labor-market partners’ initiatives were followed by those of the government.  With 
the return of the Social Democrats to power in 1993, labor market policy reforms – which the 
Social Democrats and unions had opposed under the previous bourgeois government – appeared 
on the political agenda.  In the labor market reform of 1994, Poul Nyrop Rasmussen’s Social 
Democratic government imposed an “active labor market policy” on the largely passive 
unemployment compensation system.  This increased active expenditures for training and 
employment, reduced maximum duration of unemployment (including activation) from 9 years 
to 5 years; imposed an obligation to activation within a maximum of two years of 
unemployment; and provided various paid leave schemes to open jobs temporarily for the 
unemployed.  As of 2000, Denmark topped the world in terms of total labor market spending at 
4.5% of GDP, and its active labor market expenditures were just behind Ireland and Netherlands 
with Sweden following it closely (Plougmann & Madsen 2002, p. 13). 
 
  In essence Danish policy, as Stein Kuhnle puts it, “is one of promoting employment 
security rather than job security” (Cohn 2007). High levels of passive unemployment 
compensation – up to 90% for unskilled and about 80% for the skilled – dramatically reduce the 
economic threat of unemployment to workers and lead unions to accept less job security than is 
generally true in Europe.  “There can be no doubt,” conclude Andersen and Mailand,  “that the 
relatively high level of unemployment benefit is decisive for the trade unions’ acceptance of the 
ease and flexibility of firing employees in Denmark” (2005, p. 20).  
 
  Both unions and employers see this social contract on unemployment compensation as 
crucial to labor market stability. In 2003, the Danish center-right government proposed to cut 
unemployment replacement ratio for higher wage employees.  From an Anglo-American 
perspective, one would have expected the employers to jump at this, but both unions and 
employers rejected idea and government pulled it down despite its majority in parliament.  
Subsequently, in the 2004 manufacturing sector collective agreement, the labor-market partners 
added a poison pill to the effect that, should the government change the unemployment 
compensation system, the relevant parts of the agreement would automatically be reopened 
(Andersen and Mailand 2005, p. 21).   
 
  What is striking here is the correlation between strong unions and labor-market 
flexibility.  The high level of union density leads the unions and employers to pursue the general 
interest rather than special interests at the bargaining table.  Their social contract appears to 
override the narrow, utility-maximizing interest of either.  The result is that Denmark has a lower 
unemployment rate and a higher employment rate than either the US or the EU-15.  
    20
                                                
  The Danish system is compatible with a very high rate of participation in employment.  
Table 1 charts the “employment rate” in 2005, that is, the proportion of those in the working ages 
who are currently employed.  Note that all the Scandinavian countries with the exception of 
Finland already exceed the Lisbon 2010 goal of 70%.  All, again with the exception of Finland, 
exceed the employment rates in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
18 All, without 
exception, exceed the European Union-15 average (which includes Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden) and all exceed the OECD average (which includes all five).  
 
Table 1.  Employment rate in 2005:  Percentage of persons in the working ages (15-64) currently 
employed 
 
     Male   Female   Total 
 
 Denmark    80.1       70.8       75.5 
 Finland   69.4       66.5       68.0 
 Iceland     87.4       81.2       84.4 
 Norway    78.3       72.0       75.2 
 Sweden   75.9       71.8       73.9 
 
 UK     78.6       66.8       72.6 
 US     77.6       65.5       71.5 
 
 EU-15  total    72.9       55.7       65.2 
 OEOC  total    75.0       56.1       65.5 
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2007:  Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics  
Accessed at http://miranda.sourceoecd.org/vl=6611018/cl=29/nw=1/rpsv/factbook/data/06-01-
01-T03.xls on 4/28/07.  Note that the EU employment rate only moved from 63.5% in 2000 to 
65.2% in 2005, the halfway mark on the Lisbon goal of 70%. 
 
 
Pension reform.  Pension issues are a nearly universal challenge to social welfare 
policies of OECD states.  The challenge ranges from severe in Germany and Italy where the 
unfunded liability of public pensions is enormous, through moderately “distressed” cases such as 
the U.S. Social Security System which will face soaring payments over coming decades, through 
those countries that either have minimized their public old age pension programs like Britain or 
which have a favorable demographic outlook (Ireland). 
  
All of the Nordic countries have made major reforms to their old age pension system to 
provide a viable economic basis for income security for the growing elderly proportion of the 
population. The trend has been to increase the “defined contribution” share of pensions while 
 
18  Finnish and Sweden rates of employment plummeted from 74.1% and 83.1% respectively in 1990 to 61.1% and 
72.2% in 1995 as a result of the economic crisis following the collapse of the Soviet Union in those two countries.  
The subsequent recovery had not fully restored employment rates ten years later.   21
                                                
reducing reliance on “defined benefit” pension funds.
19 In defined contribution plans, employees 
have some options in what sorts of securities their defined contribution funds will invest, and 
they carry most of the risk with these decisions.  
 
  The Nordic country which faced the most severe pension problem was Sweden, which 
had possibly the world’s best national defined benefit plan.  Following a hard-fought referendum 
in 1957 and national election in 1958, the Swedish Social Democrats introduced a general 
national system of supplemental pensions (the AP system) which provided for all workers a 
national defined benefit plan based on years of service and best years of wages.  Swedish 
workers with 30 years in the system could expect 60% of the average of their 15 best years’ pay 
when they retired. This came on top of the universal, flat-rate pension that all citizens received, 
which was funded from general revenues and which had been put in place in 1948. 
 
  In the initial years of Swedish supplemental pension system, funds built up rapidly and 
were plowed back into local infrastructure and housing. Indeed, the AP fund investments 
virtually eliminated the housing shortage.  By the 1980s, however, it was apparent that the rate of 
return on the AP fund was too low (in part because of the choice of placements) to finance the 
fund’s obligations. 
 
  After 10 years of commission work, the decision was made in 1994 to stabilize the AP 
Fund  by reducing benefits for younger plan participants while supplementing this DB plan with 
an additional defined contribution (DC) plan which would accumulate over time.  Of the 18½ 
percent pension contribution, 16 percent went to the DBP and 2½ percent to individual DCP 
accounts.  Contributions to the individual accounts began in 1995 but were held pending the 
development of investment vehicles which occurred in 2000. Although the unions had opposed 
the creation of individual accounts, once they were ensconced in law, the unions negotiated a 3½ 
percent of wages additional contribution to the DC plan in hopes that that would bring the 
accumulation up to the point that it offset the decline in the DB plan for younger workers. 
 
  The overall impact of these changes was, of course, to raise the pension savings rate.   
 
  The Swedish DC plan had significant start-up problems.  As a major pension 
privatization measure, the Swedish market attracted practically every international mutual fund 
manager.  Since the mutual fund industry wasn’t particularly well developed in Sweden, high 
total administrative fees in the 2-3 percent range were the rule for DC account investments – 
until the LO, the national trade union federation, cut a deal with the cooperative insurance 
company Folksam to create an LO-Folksam family of funds with administrative fees capped at ½ 
of 1 percent.  The consequence was that the private money managers had to launch new funds 
with lower administrative fees to be competitive.  The deal with Folksam may be the LO’s best 
single bargaining result for its members ever. 
 
 
19 In a “defined contribution” (DC) plan, you know how much is contributed by you and your employer, but how 
much it is worth at retirement depends on the return on your individual investment choices; in the traditional 
“defined benefit” (DB) pension, the retiree’s pension reflects his/her years of service times a multiplier.   22
                                                
  In any case, two thirds of Swedish workers opted for one to five (the maximum an 
individual could choose) of the 465 mutual funds for their DC accounts in 2000 – just in time for 
the technology stock bubble to burst.  The other third chose not to choose, and their funds went 
into the default option: the government-operated 7
th AP fund.  Ironically, the government fund 
outperformed the private funds, falling only 30% while the private funds fell 40% on the average 
over the 2000-2003 period.  The 7
th AP fund manages its largely equity portfolio with 
administrative costs of 0.16 percent versus 0.77 percent on the average in the private funds 
(Krueger 2004).  Not surprisingly, 92 percent of new entrants into the labor market have 
subsequently opted for the default 7
th AP fund. (For more information on the Swedish pension 
reform, see Andersen and Larsen 2002; Krueger 2004; and Weaver 2005.) 
 
  There is not space here to provide equal detail on Norwegian and Danish pension 
reforms.  Suffice it to say that the Norwegian bourgeois government introduced a general 
income-based, supplemental pension system in 1966, like the Swedish system, to supplement the 
basic citizen pension; they sought to avoid Labor seizing the pension issue for its own as had 
happened in Sweden.  It is that supplemental pension system that is now being stabilized by the 
Petroleum Fund.
20   
 
  The Danes expanded the universal, flat-rate citizens’ pension instead in the 1960s and 
1970s, creating what Andersen and Larsen (2002, p. 7) call “a Rolls-Royce version.”  While it 
provided close to full replacement of income for the unskilled, it fell far short for the better off, 
leading to the creation of occupational pensions for higher income groups, especially in the 
public sector, and for tax-advantaged pension savings for others.   Despairing of getting 
legislation in the 1980s after three pension commissions led to no result, the public sector unions 
negotiated a general labor market pension for those not covered under occupational pensions and 
the Danish LO and employers negotiated a general labor-market pension in the private sector in 
1991 that quickly came to cover virtually the entire labor market.  Contribution levels as of 2001 
were set at 3 percent for employers and 6 percent for employees, versus 12-17 percent for the 
continuing occupational pensions. Fund management and investment are co-determined by 
unions and employers. 
 
  What is striking in this picture is the role of collective bargaining in supplementing 
legislation (in Sweden, for example) or replacing the failure to legislate (in Denmark).  The 
general labor market pension systems of course free employees from dependence of a single 
employer for their pensions, increasing labor market flexibility.  The existence of general 
national system slashes administrative costs (the bane of privatized systems elsewhere) while 
ensuring that DC pension savings are retained to retirement (a particular problem with American 
individual 401(k)s).  Note also the fact that all the Scandinavian pension “reforms” raised the 
overall rate of pension savings. 
 
 
20 Norway is relying on its massive petroleum earnings, which are now mainly diverted to a “Norwegian Pension 
Fund -- Global” (Previously known as the “Petroleum Fund”), which are invested in foreign securities.  This fund is 
managed by the Bank of Norway and at the end of 2006 amounted to about $ 250 billion.  Danish pension funds are 
formally privatized and held assets of approximately $ 327 billion at the end of 2005. 
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  At present the Nordic states face continuing pension challenges, but are in a stronger 
position than most other OECD or EU states.  First, the demographic curve has been less 
turbulent in the region.  Birth rates are modest but stable at the replacement level. The growth of 
the older population commenced earlier in the region than in most other European regions. The 
main “problem” is the high preference for “leisure” that affects all Scandinavian age brackets 
despite significant variation between the countries. The various early retirement incentive 
schemes introduced during the period of high unemployment – particularly of younger workers – 
in the 1980s and 1990s has created a “culture” of early retirement. Nevertheless, this trend is 
weaker than in other European countries. Danes and Swedes now retire later than Americans and 
have the highest retirement age in EU (as measured by per cent of 55-64 years old males in 
employment). Although there are ample reasons for making it possible for elderly industrial 
workers to retire early, the programs have been no less popular among service workers including 
those whose jobs have minimal physical demands. The combination of high income and 
employment taxes and generous social benefits for older citizens has reduced significantly 
financial deterrence to retirement. The trend is likely to grow more problematic as the natural 
increase in the labor force continues to shrink. In the short-run the early retirement programs 
have assisted the economic restructuring of the “post-industrial” economies of the region, but the 
rising “dependency ratios” (the number of young and older non-working people currently 
employees must support) is a serious challenge. Balancing in part this trend is the exceptionally 
high labor force participation rate of Scandinavians in the 15-64 age group reflecting the full 
entrance of women into the paid labor force. Current projections are for a significant rise in the 
dependency ratio for the coming 30 years. For example, in Denmark, Finland and Sweden recent 
projections expect the ratio to rise from about 22 percent at present to 40-46 percent in 2040. For 
the EU-15 the rise will be from 26 to 50 (Eurostat, 2006).  
 
  Responding to globalization.  Another factor that strengthens the reformed Scandinavian 
welfare state model has been the successful reaction to economic globalization. As small trading 
states the challenges of an economy highly dependent on foreign economic and political 
developments is nothing new for the Scandinavians. As Katzenstein suggested two decades ago, 
there is an embracing “realism” in the economic and political institutions of small trading states 
(1985). This favorable development has scarcely been automatic; international economic 
balances were quite threatening until the economic restructuring and policy reforms took hold 
after the mid-1990s.  For most of the past decade international accounts have been positive for 




  There is substantial evidence that the universal and comprehensive welfare state typical 
of the Scandinavian countries (and others) has eased the adjustment to economic globalization. 
Since generous provision is made to those dislocated by declining economic sectors and since 
 
 21 Indeed for petroleum exporting countries like Norway managing the large inflow of foreign earnings 
proved to be both a political and economic challenge in the 1980s. The Petroleum (now Pension) Fund created in 
1990 has eased the impact and forced an expansion of a sophisticated and internationalized financial sector to 
manage the new wealth, which in recent years has amounted to 15 to 20 percent of Norwegian GDP. After 1990 
Denmark’s more modest (roughly 2% of GDP) but still significant petroleum earnings along with increased savings 
through nearly universal private pension accounts alleviated the country’s classic balance of payments problems that 
dogged the public and private economy for most of the 20
th Century.     24
social programs have expanded employment in the public and service sectors, foreign industrial 
competition has been accommodated. The “efficiencies” of international trade have been 
exploited both as importers and exporters. Taxation has been adjusted to be less dependent on a 
closed national economy. For example, business taxes in Scandinavia are generally lower than 
other OECD countries. The heavy wage taxes do affect labor, especially in Sweden where the 
various measures can add nearly 40% to the wage bill. The high and comprehensive value-added 
taxes (VAT) and excises (especially heavy on automobiles, petroleum and energy, and luxury 
goods) do not distinguish between domestic goods and imports. While the tax burden on 
Scandinavians is notoriously high, domestic employers are not disadvantaged, and actually enjoy 
the “fruits” of generous social programs (well-trained labor, flexible labor force and relatively 
broad managerial prerogatives, low health insurance, etc.). The sum of the high benefit, high 
personal taxation system seems well suited to a globalized economy (see Einhorn and Logue 
2005).  
  Moreover, the Nordic countries “spend lavishly on research and development and higher 
education,” says Columbia economist Jeff Sachs in seeking to explain their global 
competitiveness. “All of them, but especially Sweden and Finland, have taken to the sweeping 
revolution in information and communications technology and leveraged it to gain global 
competitiveness. Sweden now spends nearly 4 percent of GDP on R&D, the highest ratio in the 
world today. On average, the Nordic nations spend 3 percent of GDP on R&D, compared with 
around 2 percent in the English-speaking nations” (Sachs 2006).  It is striking that Sweden’s 
L.M. Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia (a former tire manufacturer) have come to be principal 
Western equipment suppliers of the global telecommunications revolution while their American 
and British competitors have largely been absorbed by others.  
  Still, all is not a bed of roses.  Economic globalization has led to the sale of some of the 
Scandinavian industrial “crown jewels” to multinational corporations which do not place 
Swedish interests at the top of their priority list. Thus, for example, after General Motors bought 
SAAB, it was decided in 2005 that the new SAAB car would be built in Germany, not in 
Sweden.  And Swedish executives in multinationals found their reputations tarnished by 
multinational pay and pension policy that were considered excessive by more egalitarian 
Swedish standards:  Witness the cultural shock that ABB’s Swedish CEO Percy Barnevik’s $88 
million pension and retirement benefits caused in Sweden when it was revealed in 2002.    
 
 
Social Challenges to the Scandinavian Welfare State 
 
  For more than thirty years the main focus of welfare state analysis and critique and been 
whether various models are “sustainable”:  that is whether current and future programs and 
promises can be reconciled with economic and demographic changes. It is obvious that the 
“original” welfare state models that developed in Europe between 1930 and 1970 tended toward 
a static view of socio-economic change. Although the welfare state arose in large part to respond 
to the vagaries of industrial capitalism, many of the programs required stable economic growth 
to maintain fiscal balance. Likewise social changes such as the permanent entrance of women 
into the labor force, falling birthrates, changing educational requirements of the post-industrial 
economy presented challenged all of the various European models. Ironically the “liberal” 
minimalist model typified in Europe by Britain after 1979 and Ireland seems the most resilient   25
because its ambitions for programmatic development and equality are modest. For the ambitious 
Scandinavian model the agenda and its ensuing costs have been quite dynamic. The expansion of 
public childcare as well as the major pension reforms of the 1990s are examples. It may well be 
that the great challenge in several generations is coming from the social aspects of globalization, 
and the rising ethnic diversity of previously ethnically homogeneous societies. There are 
significant differences among the Nordic countries.  More than 13% of Sweden’s population is 
of foreign origin, Denmark and Norway considerably less but more recent and rapid in 
development, and Finland facing a smaller non-European influx, but a rise in eastern European 
as well as non-European residents. These social and cultural changes impact nearly every aspect 
of contemporary politics, but social programs have been at the forefront.  
 
  As noted by many, Scandinavia’s generous social programs reduce the likelihood that 
immigrants and refugees will be “excluded” from the mainstream of society but they also present 
challenges to full integration. Even in Sweden which has had the most liberal immigration and 
integration policies backed by its formidable “active labor market” policies, there are barriers to 
integration of especially non-western immigrants. It is clearly a challenge for the coming decades 
to integrate the immigrants whose labor is required to maintain the national economies but whose 
cultural values may in some cases strain the solidarity and unity of the Nordic welfare states (see 
Caldwell 2006). It is clear that the Danes are moving toward a highly “active” integration policy 
while tightening entrance requirements (OECD 2003, ch. 2). One of the outstanding 
achievements of the Scandinavian welfare state was its role in “eliminating” the industrial 
“proletariat” through economic growth, redistribution, and modernization. It would be ironic if a 
new “global proletariat” arose in their place. 
 
 
III. Transferability of the Scandinavian model to the rest of the European Union 
 
  The Scandinavian model has clearly proven its adaptability in the last two decades, not 
least in accommodating the changes in the terms of international trade in the new global 
economy.  A comparison between the relative success of Scandinavian policies and those of 
Britain, France, Germany, or the United States would probably be as favorable to the 
Scandinavian model today as it was in 1970.  That would not have been true in 1985 or l995. 
 
  There is no question that the Scandinavian EU members largely meet the Lisbon goals 
already.  They have much to offer in policy terms to the other EU countries.  The question, 
however, is one of transferability: Is the Scandinavian model essentially (1) a structural response 
to the contradictions of advanced (or less advanced) industrial capitalism? Or does it rather 
reflect (2) the historical political and organizational balance of forces in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden between labor and employers, between socialism and conservatism?  Or does it reflect 
(3) more general issues of political culture, especially around the value accorded empiricism and 
the relative prevalence of social trust?  
 
  Another issue is the increased diversity of the European Union. There are two dimensions 
to the Nordic example. First, what “lessons” do they provide to the other advanced EU states, 
primarily within the pre-2004 “EU-15”? Second, are there elements of the Nordic models that   26
could be relevant to the “new” EU states primarily of central and Eastern Europe? Here we focus 
on the former group, but there are certainly some Scandinavian institutions that could assist the 
CEE states as they seek to reconcile economic development with social stability. 
 
  Additionally we recognize that many of the “achievements” of the Nordic states in social 
equality and security are shared or even exceeded by other EU states. Despite a different 
historical course and institutions – history is never erased – the Netherlands, Belgium, and even 
Austria share elements of the broader “social democratic” model. On a larger scale Germany 
with its so-called “Rhenish Capitalism” model was a bright beacon until the challenges of 
reunification and structural adjustment became dominant over the past fifteen years.  Finally 
there are the significant economic achievements of the United Kingdom and even more 
dramatically of Ireland. No longer the focus of economic worriers, these “liberal” examples are 
the main challenge to the collectivist examples of Scandinavia.  
 
  We believe there are three elements of the Scandinavian model that have primary 
relevance for the EU-15. First, the Nordic countries have endured significant structural economic 
and even social changes that have been facilitated by a tradition of democratic corporatism, 
coalition-building, and a reservoir of social trust. Second, they have been characterized by a 
more rational, empirically based policy reform process.  Scandinavian corporatist negotiations 
take place within broad agreement on facts.  Third, the Nordic countries have embraced 
“Europeanization” and globalization but have found ways to maintain their reformed social 
democratic model. Clearly countries that are unlikely to find that model attractive will be less 
interested in the Nordic experience. Fourth, the Nordic model has designed responses that have a 
direct impact on the “microeconomy,” that is, employees, management, entrepreneurs, and other 
constituencies. Throwing economic “levers” in the classical Keynesian fashion has never fully 
described reality in these countries and is even less accurate in the era of reform (i.e. since 1985-
90).    27
                                                
 
Table 2.  Economic and health indicators  
 
       2005 GDP     GDP      Infant mortality  Life expectancy at 
    (PPP) per capita  growth             2004    birth 2004        
     1995-2005    male  female 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Czech Rep.  20,300      2.5           3.7    72.6  79.0 
Hungary  17,200     4.3           6.6    68.6  76.9 
Poland     12,800       4.0           6.8    79.2  70.7 
 
France   30,200     2.1           3.9    76.7  83.8 
Germany  29,800     1.4           4.1    75.7  81.4 
Ireland   39,200     7.5           4.9    75.8  80.7 
Italy    28,500     1.3           4.1    76.8  82.5 
Spain    27,300     3.6           3.5    77.2  83.8 
UK    32,100     2.8           5.1    76.2  80.7 
 
Denmark  34,400      2.1             4.4    75.2  79.9 
Finland  31,400      3.5             3.3    75.3  82.3 
Norway  43,200      2.8             3.2    77.5  82.3 
Sweden  37,700      2.7             3.1      78.4  82.7 
 
Japan    30,500      1.2             2.8     78.6  85.6 
United States  41,900      3.3           6.9        74.8  80.1 
 
OECD, OECD in Figures 2006-2007. Paris. 
 
  If it is the historical political and organizational balance of forces that make the 
difference, then we have to consider whether Scandinavian-like conditions of political 
organization exist elsewhere in the EU. What are these “Scandinavian-like conditions”? 
 
1) Organization. The Scandinavian model has rested on strength of democratic, “popular” 
organizations – of farmers, workers, temperance advocates, grassroot organizations, and the like.   
The density of organizational membership is striking.  “Union density” (i.e., union membership 
as a percent of employed workers) stood at 70 percent in Denmark, 74 percent in Finland, 53 
percent in Norway, and 78 percent in Sweden in 2003, up significantly in all countries except 
Norway since 1970 (Visser 2006, pp. 45-46).
22  Farmers and employers are almost equally well 
 
22 Comparative union density numbers were 16-35% elsewhere in the EU countries (except Belgium with 55%, 
which has a similar unemployment compensation system to those in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) and 12% in the 
United States, down significantly from 1970.  Visser (2006, pp. 42-43) has adjusted the Belgian, Danish, Finnish 
and Swedish union density figures downward from the national numbers which reflect union membership as a 
percent of those in the labor force (employed and unemployed alike) to make them more comparable to those in 
other countries, where the unemployed do not remain union members.  Calculated on the basis of union membership 
including the unemployed, union membership in these four countries would be 4 to 10 percentage points higher, and 
union density in the other 20 countries in Visser’s comparison would be lower.   28
organized.  Surveys indicate that the average Dane belongs to 3.1 and the average Swede to 3.2 
organizations; only 6% of Swedes and 7% of Danes belong to no organizations (Andersen 1996, 
p. 55). 
 
It is striking that union density (cf. Visser 2006) is declining throughout most of the rest of the  
European Union.  (Exceptions in Visser’s data are Belgium with an unemployment  
compensation system structured like that in Scandinavia and Spain where genuine unions were  
illegal under Franco.)  There is no question that the labor movement strength has been key to  
modernizing the Scandinavian welfare states.  However, we note that despite far lower and  
declining union density in Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, collective  
contracts are virtually as extensive in their coverage.  This may be sufficient for the labor market  
partners to take the initiative – even when they impose state-imposed changes, as in France.   
  
2) Ties between leaders and led.  One of the striking aspects of Scandinavian popular  
organizations is the close tie between leaders and led.  Much of the strength of the Scandinavian  
farm and labor movements has lain in the fact that they recruited their leaders from within their  
own ranks.  The leaders continued to live their lives not unlike the way they lived before taking  
power. It is hard to find examples outside Scandinavia in which farmers’ parties are led by  
working farmers; in Sweden, agrarian Center leader Thorbjörn Fälldin and his wife continued to  
run their farm while Fälldin served as prime minister. Or consider our interview with Danish  
Social Democratic prime minister Anker Jørgensen: As prime minister “you can’t cut yourself  
free – and you shouldn’t cut yourself free – of where you come from.”  As prime minister,  
Jørgensen continued to attend meetings at his warehousemen’s union local and to live in the  
same four-and-a half-room, walk-up flat that he had before he entered politics (Einhorn and  
Logue 2003, pp. 126-27). Sweden’s Per Albin Hansson, prime minister from 1932-46, suffered  
his fatal heart attack in 1946 stepping off a streetcar on his way home. Forty years later, Prime  
Minister Olof Palme was assassinated when walking home with his wife (and without guards)  
from a movie. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was assassinated while shopping in a  
department store in 2003. The corruptions of power are less tempting when you are firmly  
anchored in the milieu from whence you came.  
 
3) Permanence of organizational identification.  A consequence of the factors above is 
stability in political self-identification.  Certainly at the time of the construction of Scandinavian 
model between 1930 and 1970, Scandinavians identified with their “pillar” of society – labor, 
agrarian, and in the bourgeoisie liberal or conservative – at levels not seen except in other 
pillarized societies like Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands.  While class and occupational 
based self-identification is no longer as strong in Scandinavia as it was at the time at which the 
welfare states were originally constructed, it remains exceptionally strong in comparative terms 
internationally even today. 
 
  The Scandinavian welfare states were constructed under conditions of scarcity, not those 
of abundance.  Hence in their early incarnation in – say – the 1950s, they would seem 
appropriate models for the EU countries of Eastern Europe.  But the organizational and cultural 
factors discussed above (which were stronger in Scandinavia in the 1930s – 1950s than they are 
today) are virtually absent there.    29
 
  These conditions simply do not pertain in the ex-Communist countries of central Eastern 
and Baltic Europe except, to a modest extent, in Poland where the church, repeated popular 
revolts, and, ultimately, Solidarity created some of those organizational ties. (However, the 
Solidarity’s organization wore poorly in politics.  Witness, for example, its splits and the fate of 
Lech Walesa as president of Poland.)  The legacy of Communism was the atomization of society. 
 
  This is particularly damning for the left.  The transformational ideas of the labor 
movement have been thoroughly discredited as an organizing principle.  The Communist legacy 
was to see unions as the extensions of the state, and independent labor organization fell victim to 
the massive economic dislocation of the post-Communist era.  It is hard to point to examples of 
successful trade union defense of members’ interest.  “Socialism” became the preserve of ex-
Communist apparatchiks who owed their return to power to the failure of neo-liberalism to 
deliver improved living standards for the bulk of the population and, especially, displaced 
workers and pensioners.  Generally speaking they took a neo-liberal route to the transition to 
private, market economies.  These organizational issues would seem to be reflected in the 
distribution of income in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Distribution of income 
 
    Year of    Gini     Percentage share of income or consumption  
     study    index        Lowest 20%     Middle 60%     Top 20%         Top 10% 
Czech  Rep.  1996   25.4   10.3   53.9   35.9   22.4 
Estonia 1995   35.4       6.2   52.1   41.8   26.2 
Latvia   1998   32.4       7.6   52.1   40.3   25.9 
Lithuania  1996   32.4       7.8   51.8   40.3   25.6 
Hungary  1996   30.8       8.8   51.4   39.9   24.8 
Poland   1996   32.9       7.7   51.4   40.9   26.3 
 
France   1995   32.7       7.2   52.6   40.2   25.1 
Germany  1994   30.0       8.2   53.4   38.6   23.7 
Ireland   1987   35.9       6.7   50.3   42.9   27.4 
Italy   1995   27.3       8.7   55.0   36.3   21.8 
Spain   1990   32.5       7.5   52.2   40.3   25.2 
U.K.   1991   36.1       6.6   50.5   43.0   27.3 
 
Denmark  1992   24.7       9.6   55.9   34.5   20.5 
Finland 1991   25.6   10.0   54.1   35.8   21.6 
Norway  1995   25.8       9.7   54.4   35.8   21.8 
Sweden 1992   25.0       9.6   55.8   34.5   20.1 
 
Japan   1993   24.9   10.6   53.8   37.7   21.7 
United  States  1997   40.8       5.2   48.5   46.4   30.5 
 
Source: World Bank 2001, pp. 282-83.   30
 
  If the third -- the presence or absence of a political culture of empiricism, trust, and 
solidarity -- is key, again we have to consider whether those attitudes exist or, if they don’t, 
whether they can be coaxed into being in the other EU states. This is an issue in some of the 
“old” (pre-2000) EU members where the legacy of class conflict and political stalemate remains. 
The protracted struggle for economic reforms in Germany (known as the Hartz reforms) mirrors 
the reluctance to tamper with “historical compromises” that delayed reforms in Scandinavia for 
nearly twenty years. As Katzenstein noted (1985) small open economies have fewer delusions of 
grandeur or even autonomy. Likewise Mancur Olson (1982) regarded the encompassing 
economic organizations of Scandinavia less likely to block change and seek selfish advantages. 
On the eve of Scandinavia’s last financial crisis (1990-93) Olson worried that Nordic exception 
has faded (1990), but fifteen years of reform have restored many of model’s elements.   
 
  There’s an absence of a supportive political culture for a replication of the Scandinavian 
model especially in the ex-communist  countries.  It was summed up succinctly during the debate 
on relevant foreign models in the early Yeltsin period in the early 1990s in Russia by Arkady 
Volsky, the head of the Civil Union, then a potent political coalition of general directors of large 
enterprises.  Volsky was touted at the time as a possible prime minister. “The trouble with 
Sweden as a model for Russia,” Volsky commented laconically, was that “we just don’t have 
enough Swedes.” 
 
  Indeed, if anything, the period of transition in the former communist states has led to the 
development of what Edward Banfield (1958) once described as “amoral familialism” in which 
the sphere of identification with group, class, and nation is strictly circumscribed.  One of the 
lasting impacts of the Communist period was the subordination of all popular organizations to 
the state, with all the implications that that has for subsequent independent organization and 
action.  The institutions of civil society there are exceptionally weak, and the assumptions of 
trust and solidarity that underlie everything from agricultural co-ops to union benefit societies, 
from people’s high schools to trust in government in Scandinavia are missing. As Robert Putnam 
(2000, p. 281, referencing Putnam, “Tuning in, tuning out,” p. 671) notes, in international 
comparison, “social capital appears to be highest of all” in Scandinavia. 
  
  The road to the Lisbon goals remains long. The High Level Group led by Wim Kok that 
reviewed progress in the Lisbon Agenda in 2004 noted the internal contradictions in the program 
as well as its breadth of its goals. The focus is on making the continental EU countries 
competitive with neo-liberal alternatives (mainly the United States, but including Canada, 
Ireland, and Great Britain) as well as ever growing list of global competitors especially in Asia. 
When social policy reforms can advance multiple objectives – e.g. pension programs that 
increase saving, maintain the labor force but still guarantee income security in old age – they 
make the Lisbon Agenda more feasible. There are signs of progress particularly in Germany, 
Spain, and some of the smaller EU-15 states. The revised Nordic Model is now widely known 
and attractive to a broad political spectrum. While Scandinavia continues to face real social and 
economic challenges – especially the integration of recent immigrants, once again it is at least an 
inspiration for progress.  
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